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The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a juvenile court’s
determination to terminate parental rights must be based on the statutory
factors set forth in MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW (“FL”) § 5-323. In re
Adoption/Guardianship of H.W., 460 Md. 201, 213, 189 A.3d 284, 291 (2018).
However, the court stated that the juvenile court’s use of custody factors did
not prejudice the decision, as the factual findings made by the court were
substantively similar to the findings under the necessary factors. Id.
H.W. was born in 2012 to S.B. (“Mother”) and M.W. (“Father”). Prior to
H.W.’s birth, Father was extradited out of the state and incarcerated. At the
age of six-months, H.W. was hospitalized due to injuries sustained in Mother’s
care. Following his injury, H.W. was declared to be a child in need of
assistance (“CINA”) by the juvenile court. H.W. was ultimately returned to
Mother’s custody. After a subsequent incident in 2014 with a second child,
the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (“Department”) filed for
H.W. and his siblings to be removed from Mother’s care. All three children
were found to be CINA, and were placed in Mr. and Mrs. M’s home for foster
care.
After H.W. was placed in foster care, H.W.’s case worker, Lori Lee
(“Lee”), attempted to locate Father, and learned that Father was incarcerated
in another state. Lee attempted to contact Father by mail in July of 2014, and
did not receive a response. In October of 2015, Father informed Lee he was
incarcerated again for violating his probation. That same year, the Department
filed a Petition for Guardianship with the Right to Consent to Adoption or
Long Term Care Short of Adoption for H.W. A termination of parental rights
(“TPR”) contested hearing was held in 2017.
During the TPR hearing, Lee testified to her attempted communications
with Father in the prior years, as well as Father’s history of incarceration. Lee
also testified about her visits to the foster home, H.W.’s emotional attachment
to his foster parents, H.W.’s bond to his siblings, and her belief that it would
be detrimental to H.W.’s well-being to be removed from the foster home.
Father testified, by phone, about his incarceration at the time, his inability to
receive services for H.W.’s care, and his plan to remove H.W. from Baltimore
if he were given custody.
The juvenile court examined the statutory factors set forth in FL § 5-323(d),
and additional factors set out in Ross v. Hoffman. The additional factors were
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purely custodial factors, including the possible emotional effect on the child if
custody was changed to the biological parent or the caretaker, and the stability
and certainty as to the child’s future in the custody of the parent or the custody
of the caretaker.
The juvenile court determined that the removal from the foster home would
have a detrimental effect on H.W. because of the bonds that had been created
and the stability and certainty with H.W.’s foster family; Father’s
incarceration history; and Father’s plan to remove H.W. from his siblings. The
juvenile court held that, although there was not clear and convincing evidence
that Father was unfit, there were exceptional circumstances that made the
continuation of the parental relationship detrimental to the best interests of
H.W. The court awarded guardianship to the Department and terminated
Father’s parental rights.
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals vacated the juvenile court’s ruling.
The court concluded that the juvenile court erred by examining and applying
factors that were exclusive to child custody to terminate Father’s parental
rights. The court emphasized that because of the legal differences between a
child custody case and a TPR case, child custody factors were not applicable
to the court’s analysis. The Department filed a petition for writ of certiorari
which the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted. The issue before the court
was whether the juvenile court was permitted to consider factors specific to
custody determinations when contemplating the termination of parental rights.
The court began by examining the principles associated with TPR and the
statutory requirements under FL § 5-323. In re Adoption/Guardianship of
H.W., at 216, 189 A.3d at 292. First, the court acknowledged the constitutional
right of parents to raise and care for their children as they see fit, and the
presumption that it is in the best interests of a child to remain in the custody
of their parents. Id. (citing In re Adoption/Guardianship of Rashawn H., 402
Md. 477, 937 A.2d 177 (2007)). The court also recognized that a parent’s
power and control of a child can be limited by the State’s interest in the
protection of a child when considering the child’s best interests. In re
Adoption/Guardianship of H.W., at 216, 189 A.3d at 292.
Next, the court looked to the relevant statutory provisions. The court
examined FL § 5-323(b), which provides a guide for the judiciary to balance
the protection of parent’s rights and a child’s best interest in a TPR proceeding.
In re Adoption/Guardianship of H.W., at 216, 189 A.3d at 292. Specifically,
FL § 5-323 states that the court must find, by clear and convincing evidence,
that a legal parent is either unfit to continue in the role as parent, or that there
are exceptional circumstances making the parental relationship harmful to the
child’s best interests. Additionally, a finding that the termination of the
parent’s rights is in the best interest of the child must be based on the factors
in FL § 5-323(d). Id. at 216, 189 A.3d 292-93 (citing MD. ANN. CODE, FAM.
LAW, § 5-323(b), MD. ANN. CODE, FAM. LAW, § 5-323(d)). The court noted
that although the statute sets forth a list of factors for consideration, FL § 5323(d) does not contemplate that the statutory factors are exclusive. In re
Adoption/Guardianship of H.W., at 219-20, 189 A.3d at 294-95.
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Next the court examined what additional factors would be permissible to
consider in a TPR proceeding. In re Adoption/Guardianship of H.W., at 22021, 189 A.3d at 295-96. The court agreed with the Court of Special Appeals
that factors specific to custody are not applicable in TPR cases. Id. at 223, 189
A.3d at 296-97. The court examined Maryland’s case law comparing TPR and
custody hearings, and reiterated that the unfitness and exceptional
circumstances analysis in TPR cases differs from the court’s analysis in
custody cases. Id. at 231, 189 A.3d at 301. The court explained that if custody
factors are incorporated into the analysis in a TPR case, the court’s risk
allowing third-party custodians to have an equal claim to the child against a
natural parent. Id. at 226, 189 A.3d at 298. The court cautioned that when
there is consideration of factors that are not required by the statute, the factors
used must be specially tailored to the parental relationship and the child’s best
interests, rather than custody. Id. at 231-32, 189 A.3d at 301-02. The court
indicated that this was to solidify the requirement that all findings must be
based on the parent’s detrimental relationship with the child. Id. at 232, 189
A.3d at 302.
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals of Maryland found that the juvenile
court’s use of custody-specific factors was not an abuse of discretion. In re
Adoption/Guardianship of H.W., at 231-32, 189 A.3d at 302. The juvenile
court applied the relevant facts to both the custody-specific factors and
statutory factors to terminate Father’s rights. Id. at 226-31, 189 A.3d at 299301. Here, the court found that a bulk of the conclusions made using the
custody-specific factors were duplicative of the findings under the required
statutory factors. Id. at 232, 189 A.3d at 302.
Judge Hotten wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part
with the majority’s opinion. In re Adoption/Guardianship of H.W., at 234, 189
A.3d at 303. While Hotten agreed with the Majority that using factors outside
the TPR statute in the final determination could be harmful, he disagreed that
the use here was not an abuse of the juvenile court’s discretion. Id. at 234-35,
189 A.3d at 303. Hotten argued that the use of custody-specific factors could
lead to a finding of exceptional circumstances where there are not any, and
may bolster a finding based on a pre-determined goal to terminate parental
rights. Id. at 240, 189 A.3d at 307.
In In re Adoption/Guardianship of H.W., the Court of Appeals found that
when a juvenile court applied factors that were exclusive to custody in a TPR
proceeding, there was no abuse of discretion when its findings under the
custody factors were substantively similar to the findings under the factors in
FL § 5-323. The holding of this case serves as an explicit caution to attorneys
and juvenile courts to carefully argue and apply factors outside the scope of
the termination of parental rights. Considering the high standard applied to
the termination of parental rights and the similarity to custody determinations,
it can be too easy to confuse the applicable factors and risk improperly
severing a parental relationship.

